Policy > International > United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs meeting in Vienna April 2003.

• Introduction
  
• The unintended consequences of UN led drug control initiatives.
  
• The lack of evaluation of UN led drug control initiatives' effectiveness.
  
• The divergence in policy priorities of the UN drug control system and those of WHO, UNAIDS, UK and European policy.
  
• Conclusions and Recommendations
  
• References, Background and Acronyms.

Summary

There is a crisis in international drug policy that has emerged from the failure of current UN-led initiatives to reduce global drug production and consumption. The collision of rising drug demand with prohibitionist policies has led to a range of unintended negative consequences that include the creation of crime, the undermining of harm reduction initiatives, human rights violations and environmental damage.

As member states (and other UN agencies) develop innovative evidence- based responses to national and global drug problems, the UN drug control system (CND, UNDCP and INCB) remains committed to an enforcement-based approach that evidence suggests is ineffective and often counterproductive. This intransigence on the part of UN agencies is creating tensions in UN decision making bodies and negatively impacting on the UK's ability to develop and implement effective crime and harm reduction strategies.

Transform urges the UK delegation to Vienna to call for a review of current UN drug control policy and for a process of evaluation to be put in place that includes consideration the wider impacts of policy on currently overlooked areas of concern.

Introduction

There is a crisis in international drug policy. After three UN treaties spanning four decades and many billions spent on co-ordinated international drug control and enforcement, the market for illegal drugs continues to expand. The negative impacts of these illegal markets expand accordingly. This crisis has been precipitated by the collision of rising illegal drug use with policies formulated in an era when patterns of use were unrecognisable from today.

The Commission for Narcotic Drugs (CND) meets for its annual report this April, and includes a Ministerial Conference of member states. This meeting comes at an important watershed, the half way point in the ten year strategy for the elimination or significant reduction in poppy, coca and cannabis cultivation, devised at the 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) under the banner "a drug free world we can do it!". A joint ministerial statement is due to be released, making recommendations for the next five years. As the delegates review progress against these ambitious targets they need to reflect on a number of concerns arising from the drug policy and its aims, methods and impacts.

This briefing elaborates on the key concerns of the Transform regarding the design and implementation of UN led international drug control policy. transform would encourage the UK delegation to use the opportunity presented by the Vienna meeting to instigate a meaningful debate on the issues and recommendations raised in this briefing; to learn from past failings and take international drug control policy towards a more just and effective future.

1. Unintended consequences of current initiatives

"Policies can have an indirect impact on other policies either in the same department or other departments and organisations… A policy may also have an unintended impact."

"…they (Government departments) need to review policies, for example to determine when the time is right to modify a policy in response to changing circumstances so that it remains relevant and cost effective; and departments may need to terminate policies if they are no longer cost effective or they are not delivering the policy outcomes intended." (1)
Modern Policy making. - Ensuring policies deliver value for money National Audit Office 2001

The UK updated drugs strategy 2002 refers to "maintaining prohibition" (2) for the first time. This is with reference to prohibition's supposed deterrent effect. However, no consideration is given to the potential negative impacts of prohibition. Violent and deregulated illegal markets are the inevitable result when a policy of prohibition collides with a continued or growing demand for the prohibited substances, just as with alcohol in 20's and 30's USA. Significantly the negative impacts of prohibition in the UK (and globally) have expanded in proportion to the ballooning demand for illegal drugs over the past three decades.

The price of illegal drugs is artificially high. The price of a kilo of cocaine in Colombia is £1 000. In the UK it is £30 000 (3). This 3000% profit margin not only attracts organised crime, it also makes street prices far higher than they would be in a legal market, leading to high levels of property crime amongst problematic users.

That heroin use in the UK has increased by over 1000% since 1971 illustrates the extent to which the policy-making environment has shifted (4). This has presented problems that could hardly have been imagined when the original UN drug control treaties were drafted.

It is key when reviewing and developing international drug policy, that the negative impacts of illegal markets and drug control enforcement are not confused with the negative impacts of the use of illegal drugs. As part of a thorough evaluation of current policy effectiveness it is essential that due consideration is given to wider impacts including the negative and unintended consequences detailed below.

1.1 Crime and Security

1.1 a) Global

The huge demand for prohibited drugs has created the illegal drugs market now worth an estimated $100 -200 billion a year. The inflated prices of illegal drugs provide an extraordinary profit opportunity for trans-national criminal organisations, whether traditional organised crime networks, or newer terrorist groups. As an adjunct to illegal drug supply activities, such groups are invariably also involved in murder, assault, fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, intimidation and corruption.

1.1 b) National

For producer countries in particular the profits made from illegal drugs fuel corruption at all levels of government and the criminal justice system, undermining social development and endangering fundamental social structures.

The recent UK Home Office research into the social and economic impact of illegal drugs in the UK estimated the costs in 2000 at between £10.1 and £17.4 billion. It calculated that 70% of this figure are "victim costs of crime" rather than the impacts of drug use itself (5). This research strongly suggests that the cost to society from drug use is eclipsed by the far greater burden generated by the crime that results when prohibition policies collide with rising use.

1.1 c) Local

At the local level prohibition has created violent territorial battles ('turf wars') between rival drug gangs fighting to secure the large profits offered by illegal drug markets. This is particularly the case in socially deprived communities where rates of problematic drug use are highest (6).

Police have also closely associated the alarming recent rise in gun crime with the development of territorial battles to control illegal drug markets. The gun deaths in Aston are the most recent reminder. The community impact of rising gun crime and the inevitable armed police response can be devastating.

The Home Office estimates that 50% of all property crime is committed by the UK's approximately 300,000 problematic heroin and crack users. These drugs are essentially worthless commodities that only assume huge value because of their scarcity and the risks carried by the chain of criminal suppliers. These inflated street prices fuel offending amongst problematic illegal users, a phenomenon not observed amongst problematic users of legal drugs. Demand for drugs amongst problematic users is also relatively price inelastic, and therefore a rise in price, that would theoretically result from successful interdiction efforts, will tend to lead to a rise in property crime.

1.2 Human Rights

• There is widespread use of the death penalty for drug offences in violation of the UN charter of human rights. China routinely celebrates UN world anti- drugs day with mass executions of drug offenders, 64 being executed on June 27th 2002, and 54 the previous year (7). To the TDPI's knowledge the CND have not publicly condemned this practice despite the UN Commission on Human Rights calling for a moratorium on all executions.
  
• An estimated 2 million people are imprisoned globally for drug offences, one quarter of the total prison population. This places a huge financial and human cost on society with little evidence of benefits.
  
• Indigenous cultures in some producer countries that have long traditions of medical and ceremonial uses of local drug crops (coca, opium and cannabis) have come under attack through the criminalisation of traditional practices and aggressive eradication programmes.
  
• It is invariably the weakest links in the illegal drug chain (peasant growers, drug 'mules', and problematic users) who feel the greatest impact of drug enforcement. The top players have the resources to evade legal consequences and bargaining power (as informants) if they are caught.

1.3 Public Health:

• · The significant impact of the UN drug control policy focus on enforcement and interdiction is that health based interventions and harm reduction suffer from funding constraints and political obstacles. The result is higher rates of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases, more drug deaths from overdose and infection, and generally higher rates of drug related harm.
  
• Many of the harms associated with illegal drug use are a direct result of their illegality, relating to unknown strength, impurities, inadequate information and a tendency to move to more concentrated versions of drugs (heroin and crack). This makes a perverse situation where one set of polices is creating collateral damage that another set of policies is then seeking to reduce.

1.4 Environmental damage

• Crop eradication using aerial fumigation causes serious large scale environmental damage but has not been effective at reducing global drug production, which is so profitable that it relocates to new regions, often further exacerbating negative environmental impacts.
  
• Serious concerns have been raised over the UNDCP program (part funded by the UK) to develop mycoherbicides, fungus designed to attack specific species of drug crops. The concerns relate to dangers of epidemic spread, cross-infection of non-drug crops and threats to human health (8).

2. The lack of evaluation of UN drug control initiatives.

"The costs of failing to identify flaws in policy design and implementation and not learning lessons from previous policy initiatives can be substantial." (1)
Modern Policy Making: Ensuring policies deliver value for money.
National Audit Office, 2001.

In the wake of rising global drug use and production during the 90's, calls grew for a review of the efficacy and viability of the UN drug control system's enforcement oriented strategy. These calls were led by Mexico, which in 1993 called for the 1998 UNGASS to be convened. The idea was for a global review of anti-drug strategies, with a view to improving and adapting them for the next century.

Unfortunately this review failed to take place due to pressure from states which advocated more forceful application of existing control policies as the only way to achieve the so far elusive reductions in drug supply and demand. This pressure led to a proposal to install an expert review committee (to undertake an independent evaluation of drug control efforts and 'new strategies') perishing at the very first pre UNGASS 'Prep­Com' meeting in Vienna in March 1997.

Ultimately the 1998 UNGASS involved no meaningful evaluation or review of policy effectiveness or the wider impact of the UN drug control system's increasingly repressive approach. As a New York Times editorial phrased it, it was devoted to "recycling unrealistic pledges".

More recently a management crisis at the UNDCP resulted in the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) being called in to investigate. One of the OIOS reports concluded: "lacking was a consistent system for programme oversight in the form of monitoring implementation and assessing results. (..) Thematic evaluations were few and had not led to much-needed substantive discussions or changes in practice. There was no mechanism to formulate lessons learned and to feed them back into programme formulation and delivery." (9).

Available evidence suggests that CND led supply control efforts have, at best, had an impact that is marginal, localised and temporary. The CND has produced no evidence that any supply control programmes (including eradication, crop substitution or international enforcement and interdiction) have ever been effective in global terms. On the contrary trends in production and use of the drugs crops singled out in 1998 have continued to rise. Heroin and cocaine are cheaper and more available than ever before in UK street markets (10).

A review of the UNDCP 2000 World Drug Report (by Carla Rossi, a board member of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction) concluded that "the volume cannot be considered of any value in terms of information, and even less so in terms of scientific rigor", and that it served "the aim of twisting the data in order to support pre-established theses that are not corroborated at all by real epidemiological observations" (11). The OISIS also concluded that claimed successes on the drugs front were "beyond the limits of credibility " (12).

A useful insight into this issue comes from the US National Academy of Sciences, which in 2001 produced a detailed report for the White House Office of Drug Control Policy called 'Informing America's Policy on Illegal Drugs: What We Don't Know Keeps Hurting Us'. The report suggests that the US shares many shortcomings with the UNDCP in terms of evaluating effectiveness:

"The committee finds that existing drug use monitoring systems are useful for some important purposes, yet they are strikingly inadequate to support the full range of policy decisions this nation must make."

"The central problem is a woeful lack of investment in programs of data collection and empirical research that would enable evaluation of the nations investment in enforcement."

"Because of a lack of investment in data and research the country is in no better position to evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement than it was twenty years ago."

"It is unconscionable for this country to continue to carry out a policy of this magnitude and cost without any way of knowing whether or to what extent it is having the desired effect." (13)

3. Divergence between UN drug control policy and that of WHO, UNAIDS and UK drug strategy

In UN agencies outside of the UN drug control machinery (CND, INCB, UNDCP) the concept of harm reduction, or harm minimisation, has rapidly gained ground. The World Health Organisation, UN Development Programme and UNAIDS use the term as a matter of course. The UNGASS 2001 on HIV/AIDS adopted a declaration that called for "harm reduction efforts related to drug use" and "expanded access to essential commodities, including [..] sterile injecting equipment". Similarly, harm reduction is now a central plank of UK drug policy thinking. In the 2002 updated drugs strategy (p.3) David Blunkett calls harm minimisation one of "our most powerful tools in dealing with drugs". (2)

By contrast the UN drug control bodies are extremely wary of the 'harm reduction' concept considering it "controversial in many environments" and stating that the term "has been used as a flag for a variety of causes and, as such, has been given disproportionate attention" (14). This equivocal stance towards harm reduction combined with the overwhelming focus on enforcement and eradication makes the CND increasingly isolated from the UN system, and increasingly at odds with trends in UK and European policy development.

A divergence of views in response to the current crisis

There is a growing divergence of views over how to address the current crisis between the UN drug control bodies and a number of key member states. This has been caused by policy evolution and innovation amongst certain states (most in Western Europe but also including Australia, New Zealand and Canada) relative to the dogmatism and stagnation in UN drug control policy thinking. On one side is the progressive European view which puts emphasis on tolerant policing, harm reduction and health based interventions such as needle exchanges, substitute prescribing, safe injecting rooms, and decriminalisation of possession. On the other side is the dominant US/CND view, that the 'war on drugs' must be pursued with renewed vigour, characterised by concepts such as 'zero tolerance', increasing militarisation of drug enforcement, harsher sentencing and crop eradication.

There is no question that sooner or later the European tolerance trend will run into the limitations of the UN conventions. It already touches the very edges of the letter and spirit of some articles. Most steps taken along this path so far are defensible in that they technically adhere to the conventions, but this defence already requires some creativity of interpretation and space for further experimentation and innovation is minimal. It is likely that the tensions between European drug policy developments and strict treaty adherence will be a major theme in Vienna.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

Note:
During discussions in the run up to the Vienna meeting the United States declared that it was not necessary "to agree on a declaration to be adopted by the ministers at the conclusion of the ministerial-level segment" (the wording of the draft text) because "we already have the Political Declaration of 1998". They objected to the word 'declaration', which might give the impression that the new declaration could replace or adjust the 1998 one. The United Kingdom supported this view, which in fact means that the objective in April 2003 will not be to re-assess the conclusions reached by the UNGASS, but should be restricted to an interim stocktaking on the implementation of the UNGASS commitments and provide recommendations for the period 2003-2007. The final resolution agreed on the wording of a "brief joint ministerial statement" to be issued at the closure of the ministerial segment of the meeting. (15)

The following recommendations are therefore intended to inform discussion as well as the content of the ministerial statement or other written recommendations or conclusions from the meeting.

• It should not be acceptable to UNDCP donor states, including the UK, that the UNDCP should operate in a virtually evidence free environment and have no meaningful evaluation of its programmes whatsoever. The UK should demand regular, comprehensive and independent evaluation of the effectiveness of CND policy and UNDCP initiatives and spending. At the very least the UK should insist that there is a clear reference to a meaningful evaluation and review process in the joint ministerial statement.
• Evaluation of spending should incorporate the wider impacts of current UN drug control policy on public health, crime, human rights and the environment. Appropriate indicators need to be developed so that impacts on these areas of concern can be satisfactorily evaluated. The level of drug seizures, for example, is not an adequate indicator of overall policy effectiveness. targets should cover all indicators used in policy evaluation, not just those likely to show success.
• The Home Affairs Select Committee stated that "We believe it is unwise, not to say self defeating, to set targets which have no earthly chance of success" (16). In light of this Transform would question the utility of the UNGASS 1998 slogan "A drug free world, we can do it!" and targets to eliminate certain crops.
• In the short term the UK must ensure 'room for manoeuvre' within the conventions such that the development and implementation of UK harm reduction initiatives and other evidence based policy innovations are not undermined.
• In the longer term the UK must question its commitment to treaties that are entrenching counterproductive policy initiatives and creating obstacles to innovative policy development when they should be facilitating it. The 2002 Home Affairs Select Committee report on UK drug policy stated that "in the longer term we believe the time has come for the treaties to be reconsidered" (16)- paragraph 266.
• The Home Affairs select committee goes further: "We recommend that the Government initiates a discussion within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of alternative ways - including the possibility of legalisation and regulation - to tackle the global drugs dilemma." (16) -paragraph 277. Whilst acknowledging that substantive reforms of the treaties are some years away, Transform welcomes this recommendation in the spirit of open dialogue and innovative thinking.

References:

(1) Modern Policy Making: Ensuring policies deliver value for money. National Audit Office, November 2001. http://www.nao.gov.uk/publications/nao_reports/01-02/0102289.pdf
(2) UK Updated Drug Strategy 2002, page 6. (ISBN 1-84082-9397)
(3) Terry Byrne, Director of law Enforcement , HM customs and excise, in oral evidence to Home Affairs Select Committee (ISBN 0 215 003349) "The Governments Drug Policy: is it working.(Vol III, p.110 para 715)
(4) Christine Godfrey Gail Eaton Cynthia McDougall and Anthony Culyer 2002. Home Office Research Study 249 "The economic and social costs of Class A drug use in England and Wales, 2000" http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hors249.pdf
(5) Drugs and the Law REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE MISUSE OF DRUGS ACT 1971. Chairman: Viscountess Runciman DBE - in reference to Home Office Notified heroin addicts index. (Chapter 2 para. 17) http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/runciman/default.htm
(6) Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs "Drug Use and the Environment" Chapter 9. The Stationary Office (ISBN 011 3411839)
(7) http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/26/china.drugs/
(8) Paul Rogers, Simon Whitby, & Malcolm Dundo,June, 1999 SILVER BULLET OR POISON CHALICE: THE BIOWAR AGAINST DRUGS.Scientific American.
(9) OIOS, Report on the Inspection of Programme Management and Administrative Practices in the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, General Assembly, A 56/83, June 1, 2001 (http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a56_83.htm)
(10) Cabinet office Minister Ian Mccartney in reply to parliamentary question From Dr Jenny Tonge MP (140370).
(11) Rossi C (2001) http://www.ijdp.org/article/S0955-3959(02)00074-9/abstract
(12) OIOS, Report on the Triennial Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations Made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its Thirty-Eight Session on the In-depth Evaluation of the United Nations International Drug control Programme, ECOSOC,E/AC.51/2001/4, May 4, 2001 (http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/eac51_2001_4.pdf)
(13) Informing America's Policy on Illegal Drugs: What We Don't Know Keeps Hurting Us Committee on Data and Research for Policy on Illegal Drugs, Charles F. Manski, John V. Pepper, and Carol V. Petrie, Editors, Committee on Law and Justice and Committee on National Statistics, National Research Council 2001. http://www.nap.edu/books/0309072735/html/
(14) UNODC report (ISBN 92-1-148144-9 ), Preface page v. URL: http://www.unodc.un.or.th/drugsandhiv/projects/g22/best_practice_02.pdf
(15) http://www.ungassondrugs.org/index.php
(16) Home Affairs Select Committee (ISBN 0 215 003349) "The Governments Drug Policy: is it working.

Background

• Transform would like to acknowledge the Transnational Institute for the substantial contribution their work has made to this briefing.(http://www.tni.org/drugs/index.htm)
  
• In particular: Amira Armenta, Martin Jelsma, Tom Blickman, Virginia Montañés David Bewley-Taylo, 'Breaking the Impasse: Polarisation & Paralysis in UN Drug Control, Drugs & Conflict nr. 5' - July 2002Transnational Institute.
  
• Danny Kushlick, Deficiencies of the report highlight deficiencies in UNDCP approach, International Journal of Drug Policy 13 (3) (2002) p. 237 - 238.

UN Acronyms:

CND - Commission for Narcotic Drugs

"The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is the central policy-making body within the United Nations system dealing with drug-related matters. It analyses the world drug situation and develops proposals to strengthen the international drug control system to combat the world drug problem". Also the "the governing body of UNDCP". (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/index.html)

UNDCP - United Nations Drug Control Programme

"Founded in 1991, UNDCP works to educate the world about the dangers of drug abuse. The Programme aims to strengthen international action against drug production, trafficking and drug-related crime through alternative development projects, crop monitoring and anti-money laundering programmes" (http://www.unodc.org/)

INCB - International Narcotics Control Board

"The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is the independent and quasi-judicial control body for the implementation of the United Nations drug conventions. It was established in 1968 by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. INCB is independent of Governments as well as of the United Nations; its 13 members serve in their personal capacity." (http://www.incb.org/incb/index.html)

UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

"The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the umbrella organization that makes up the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP). It also includes the Terrorism Prevention Branch and the Global Programmes against Money Laundering, Corruption, Organized Crime and Trafficking in Human beings. All the organizations are based in Vienna, Austria." (http://www.unodc.org/)